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By AARON S . EDLIN AND JOSEPH E . STIGLITZ*
Managerial theories of the firm have a long
and controversial history, beginning perhaps
with Adolf A. Berle, Jr. and Gardiner C.
Means's classic (1932) study. Such theories
postulated that managers had considerable dis-
cretion running corporations and exercised it
to pursue objectives other than maximizing
shareholder market value.
Critics later denied that managers really
have discretion, arguing that such behavior
could not survive in equilibrium. Either man-
agement would be voted from office, the firm
would be taken over, or the firm would go
bankrupt in a competitive product market.
The more recent literature on information
economics emasculated these criticisms. Man-
agers are important to corporate decision-mak-
ing because of their expertise and the
information they acquire about the firm and its
prospects. Yet the very information asymme-
tries that create a need for management also
limit the discipline that the board of directors
can impose on managers. At the same time,
neither the shareholder-voting mechanism nor
the takeover mechanism provides effective
discipline.' Small shareholders free ride on the
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' The theoretical literature on takeovers includes
Stiglitz (1972, 1975) and Sanford S. Grossman and Oliver
D. Hart (1980). The empirical literature includes Michael
Jensen (1988), David Scharfstein (1988), and Andrei
Shleifer and Robert W. Vishny (1988). For discussions of
efforts of others, since it does not pay for them
to obtain the costly information needed to ex-
ercise their proxy vote intelligently. Moreover,
if a takeover will enhance the productivity of
the firm, it will likewise enhance its market
value, so small shareholders are better off
holding onto their shares than tendering them.
Takeovers can therefore be difficult when
ownership is dispersed. Indeed, the theoretical
arguments suggest that the takeover mecha-
nism should be even less effective than it
seems to be in practice. It has become more of
a theoretical puzzle to explain the existence
of managerial discipline than of managerial
discretion.^
These observations argue for a return to the
viewpoint of the earlier managerial literature,
which presumed that managers have discretion
and asked how they will use it (see James G.
March and Simon, 1958; Robin L. Marris,
1964; Oliver E. Williamson, 1964; Harvey
Leibenstein, 1966). This paper continues that
tradition, examining one route—namely, in-
vestment choice—by which managerial dis-
cretion affords managers the opportunity to
obtain "rents" (payments in excess of their
opportunity costs). We thereby expand on the
theme of Shleifer and Vishny's (1989) insight-
ful paper on "managerial entrenchment."
A somewhat earlier literature on incomplete
contracts emphasized the investment conse-
quences of rent-seeking. That literature ex-
plained how concern about opportunism can
the voting (or proxy) control mechanisms, see Stiglitz
(1981), Jensen and Richard S. Ruback (1983), and Randall
Morcketal. (1989).
- Early literature, such as Berle (1926), stressed the dis-
ciplinary role of banks (see also Stiglitz, 1985). More re-
cently, organization theorists and some economists have
emphasized social control mechanisms (attempts to make
managers identify with the company, and adopt the ' 'well-
being" of the corporation as their own private goals). On
this, see George A. Akerlof (1991) and Herbert A. Simon
(1991).
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lead to underinvestment in such relationship-
specific investments such as a manager's
investment in tirm-specific human capital (see
Aaron S. EdHn and Stefan Reichelstein [1993]
for citations). We argue here for a broader
view of the biases in managers' decisions: In
general, managerial rent-seeking affects not
only the level of investment, but also ihe form?
Our basic hypothesis is simple: given the
now well-established scope for managerial
discretion, managers have an incentive to ex-
ercise that discretion to enhance their income.
Any managerial contract is subject to renego-
tiation, and a manager's pay is the outcome of
an often bewildering bargaining process be-
tween management, the board of directors, and
rival management teams or takeover artists.
Two critical factors in that bargaining process
are the incumbent management's productivity
relative to rivals and the wages that rivals
demand. A manager may increase her com-
pensation either by increasing her own pro-
ductivity (the aspect generally stressed) or by
decreasing the threat from rival managers.**
Shleifer and Vishny (1989) consider the latter
possibility and show that a manager can in-
crease her rents by choosing to invest in proj-
ects she can manage better than her rivals.
Here we explore a new avenue for entrench-
ment. The prototypical example of the Shleifer
and Vishny (1989) effect is a secretary who
becomes invaluable by rearranging a filing
system to suit his own idiosyncratic search pat-
terns. Yet we observe that managers often
retain their jobs without making such invest-
ments; they are rehired even when they select
assets for which their own idiosyncratic talents
are not the best match. We suggest that these
managers may preserve their jobs by investing
in activities for which information asymme-
tries are particularly large (our arguments are
in the same spirit as Laurie S. Bagwell and Josef
Zechner [1993]). In our theory, managers in-
vest to create these asymmetries, not to exploit
their talents. They thus engage in a form of
rent-seeking even less productive than that
considered by Shleifer and Vishny (1989).
Our theory predicts, for example, that man-
agers will overvalue acquisitions that promise
potential, but not certain, synergies, since such
acquisitions can bring rents to incumbent man-
agers as long as they get earlier or more
accurate signals than rivals of whether these
synergies materialize. This argument suggests
that the recent wave of acquisitions in the
media and communications industries is a
sensible entrenchment strategy, because the
potential synergies are large, even if the ex-
pected synergies might not be.
Such possibilities become clearer as the pa-
per unfolds. Section I sets up the framework
for discouraging rivals. Section II analyzes
how to discourage rivals who can observe in-
vestment levels. Section III considers discour-
aging rivals who cannot observe the mix of
investment, and the final section outlines some
implications of the analysis both for policy and
empirical work.
I. Discouraging Rivals: The Framework
We present a three-stage model. In the first
stage the manager chooses investments. In the
second, the board of directors decides who will
manage the firm's assets, and in the third, the
manager manages the assets.
Managers choose investments to maximize
the product of the probability that they are re-
hired in stage 2 and the rents they expect to
accrue conditional upon being rehired:
max [£[rents | incumbent rehired]
' See Ediin (1992) for the argument that the important
distortions in the incomplete-contracts context are also in
the form, not the level, of investment,
" Although the contexts differ, there is a strong simi-
larity between our argument and Steven C, Salop and
David T, Scheffman's (1983, 1987) analysis of the behav-
ior of firms in imperfectly competitive markets. They
argue that firms can enhance their profits not only by in-
creasing their own productivity, but also by reducing the
threat of rivals, (i.e., by raising rivals' costs).
X Pr [ incumbent rehired} ] .
This formulation does not imply risk neutral-
ity: instead, these rents are in units of utility
and represent the difference between the utility
the manager could get from outside opportu-
nities (which we assume to be constant) and
the utility from the stage-2 contract, which is
a function of the contract she negotiates and
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the effort she subsequently expends. We will
soon be explicit about the sources of these
rents, but at a general level, our argument is
simply this: as the inherent ability of a mana-
ger's rivals falls, as the effort rival managers
will exert falls, or as rivals demand higher
wages to accept the position, then the incum-
bent manager will gather increased rents from
contract negotiations, other things being equal.
Of course, some students of corporate cul-
ture may rebel at the image of a board of di-
rectors negotiating with the manager: The
manager is often thought simply to name the
terms of her contract, with the board providing
the rubber stamp. Indeed, boards sometimes
do approve contracts with incumbent manag-
ers that predictably leave the firm worse off
than under rival management. Nonetheless,
even those who take an extreme view of the
agency problems involved in the board's rep-
resentation of shareholder interests will con-
cede that something limits what managers can
successfully demand. We suggest that these
limits ultimately stem from the threat of re-
placement by rivals. We therefore examine
how managers can reduce this threat by dis-
couraging rivals.
In our formulation, a firm's terminal, or
stage-3 return, /?, is a product of the effective
quality of the manager and the prospects of the
firm's ongoing projects:
(1) = (C, + C2)q{e)
where q is the effective quality of the man-
ager, which may depend upon effort e, and
C, represents the "prospects" in project i, i
€ {1 ,2} . The two projects can be thought
of as a "short-run" and "long-run" project,
or as two different activities run over the
same time horizon. C, may represent the po-
tential cash fiows or underlying "capital" of
project i. It is stochastically related to the
firm's stage-1 investment according to some
risk 6i, which increases proportionately with
investment:
(2) C, =F , ( / , ) + ^,
where
We consider two main cases: in the first, out-
siders can observe the mix of investment in the
two activities; in the second, they only observe
total investment / | + h. In both cases, the in-
cumbent observes C, accurately, while rivals
must try to infer C, from the signals Y,, defined
as
(3) Y. = C, + e,
where
, / > ? ) , « € {1,2}
and where the e's and ^'s are all independent.
The first-best mix of investment maximizes
E[C\ + C2]. Assuming an interior solution,
optimal investments are some I* and / f such
that E\{I*) = Eiil*)- The next two sections
show, however, that these first-best invest-
ments do not solve the investment problem for
a manager trying to entrench herself. The in-
vestment choices will be distorted regardless
of whether the mix of investment she chooses
is observable to outsiders or remains unob-
servable. In either case, the manager favors
investments in which information is more
quickly or fully revealed to her than to outsid-
ers, although the reasons for the distortions
differ somewhat between the two cases.
II. Case 1: Observable Investment
Rivals base their expectation of the firm's
potential cash fiows on their observations Y^




We derive this expectation formula in the
Appendix. Since in this section's analysis.
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outsiders can observe the investment mix, the
intercept term /3o is a function of the actual
investments / | and h. This feature differs from
Section III, which analyzes unobservable
investment.
A. Investing to Discourage Rivals' Efforts
After the investments are chosen, the assets
must be managed, either by the incumbent
manager or by some rival. In either case, the
manager chooses her effort level to maximize
her expected utility given her information. The
firm must provide the manager with some in-
centive to expend effort, and for simplicity we
assume that the manager who is given respon-
sibility for managing the assets has an incen-
tive contract giving her a share in profits.'
Thus, if W represents manager j ' s fixed wage
income, .s her share of profits, U her utility
function, /7,e her personal cost of expending
effort e {pj is an index of her ability), and $
her information set, the manager chooses ef-
fort to maximize
(5)
Assuming constant absolute risk aversion, so
that the certainty equivalent is linear in the
mean and variance of wealth,* the manager's
problem is to maximize
(6)
where Var[(C| -I- C2)|$] is the variance of
Ci -f C2 conditional upon the manager's in-
formation $ and where k equals half of the
degree of absolute risk aversion. We assume
that effective worker quality q{e) increases
with effort. Effort is costly and so, all else
' For one justification of linear incentive schemes, see
Bengt Holmstrom and Paul R. Milgrom (1987).
' We do not require all the structure of constant abso-
lute risk aversion in order for Lemma 1 to hold and the
subsequent analysis to be valid. In particular, the strong
linearity is not important: it would be sufficient for our
purposes that effort enter separably and that managers'
utility be some increasing function of expected wealth and
decreasing function of the variance of wealth.
equal, managers with a higher cost of effort pj
exert less effort, and have lower effective qual-
ity. However, a manager's effort, and hence
effective quality q, also depends upon her ap-
praisal of a firm's prospects.
In our model, a rival who takes over a man-
agement role must decide her effort before
learning the prospects C| -I- C2. This timing
captures important features that we would ne-
glect by assuming that rivals observe C| and
C2 before choosing effort. When the rival takes
over, he will not be handed the keys to some
safe containing the secret information " C | "
and "C2." That would be a poor caricature of
private information. Witness the fact that it
took John ScuUey four months to discover the
desperate condition of Spectrum, and consider
that such information is often less concrete
than in that case.' Relevant information can be
quite diffuse, spread among many present and
former officials of the firm, and revelation to
the new management team is far from imme-
diate. Thus, while our assumption that nothing
new is learned after taking the helm is ex-
treme, it neatly captures the fact that much of
what was known to the predecessor remains
unknown to new management.
We are now prepared to state a useful
lemma.
LEMMA 1: Holding the cost of effort and
other factors constant, an interior solution to
manager j's effort choice problem e*' in-
creases with E[{Ct + C2)|$] and decreases
Var[(C| -I-
PROOF:
The lemma follows from the form of the
manager's objective function together with the
fact that effective quality q increases with ef-
fort. The cross derivative with respect to q and
E[{Ci + C2)|$] is positive and with respect
to q and Var[(Ci -I- C2)|$] is negative, so
Milgrom and Christina Shannon's (1994)
Monotone Selection Theorem implies that the
solution to manager;'s effort-choice problem
is weakly increasing in ^[(Ci + C2)|$] and
weakly decreasing in Var[(Ci +
' See Jonathan Weber (1994) for a description of the
Sculley-Spectrum saga.
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These results are strict whenever e * -' is interior
as assumed, because then if first-order condi-
tions hold for one expectation or variance, they
fail for higher ones.
We now proceed to examine how current
management's actions can poison the appli-
cant pool for the manager's job by lowering
the effectiveness of rival management. The
current manager can reduce rivals' efforts by
increasing their perceived uncertainty about
the firm's prospects. The incumbent's effort
and hence effective quality rises relative to ri-
vals with an increase in
(7)
where $riv denotes the information of the rivals
and ^i„^ denotes that of the incumbent.
Recall that the incumbent observes C, + C2,
so Var[(C| -I- C2)|$inJ = 0. In contrast, rival
management teams can only infer C| -I- C2
from the noisy signals / , and Y2. The Appen-
dix shows that
(8)
Equation (8) reveals that the manager will fa-
vor highly noisy investments (high w^ for any
given a ) : such investments decrease the ef-
fectiveness of outside managers by increasing
expression (7)." These gains from increasing
noise are larger for higher underlying risks,
and in the extreme case where cr^  = 0, w^ be-
comes irrelevant because the potential cash
fiows are fully determined by the observable
investment levels. Finally, in choosing among
projects with similar risk (a^) and noise
* Notice that such a result is quite different from the
more standard asset-substitution result of Jensen and
William H. Meckling (1976 section 4,1), They argue that
equity-holders will be biased to invest in high-risk assets
since limited liability cuts off their downside risk. The
noise W should be distinguished from the fundamental
risk CT".
for outside investors (w^), incumbents can
decrease the effectiveness of rivals by concen-
trating their investments, because of the con-
vexity of P. Accordingly, rent-seeking may
cause overspecialization,
B. Discouraging Applicants
In addition to reducing the effective qual-
ity of the rivals, the incumbent manager's
investment choices can raise rivals' wage
demands. For manager j , with reservation
utility level r(j), to be willing to work for
the firm, she must be offered a high enough
wage that
(9) W+sqie*^)E[iC,+C2)\^] -p^e*'
The right-hand side represents the familiar
fact that the manager must be compensated
both for her reservation price r{j), and for the
risk from the incentive plan given by 5. When
Var(Ci + C2|$riv) increases, any given com-
pensation package will fall below the reser-
vation wage of some rivals. These managers
choose not to apply, weakening the pool of
rivals and increasing the chance that the in-
cumbent is rehired.
C. Increasing Rivals' Winner's Curse
A third reason for a manager to invest in
noisy projects is that such projects create a
winner's curse effect. This effect further dis-
courages applicants from "applying" and
makes those who do apply demand higher off-
setting compensation. Recall that the incum-
bent knows C] + C2, so that
(10)
The rival manager does not know Ct + C2, but
knows that, if he were to observe a value of
Yt and Y2 such that his expectation of C, + C2
is the same as that of the incumbent, the board
of directors would likely stick with the incum-
bent for the two reasons already discussed: (a)
all else equal, incumbents work harder be-
cause the returns to their effort is more certain;
and (b) incumbents are willing to accept the
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job at lower compensation since their per-
ceived risk is smaller.
Thus, the incumbent will be able to cut a
deal with the board of directors, beating out
rival management offers unless (a) the incum-
bent has a very high reservation wage relative
to rivals; (b) the board of directors' estimate
of the rival's ability is high relative to the in-
cumbent; or (c) the rival has seriously over-
estimated the value of the project (s is high).
Holding the first two factors constant, the rival
manager knows he gets the job only when his
signal is overly optimistic. He takes this into
account in forming his expectations. (Con-
sider the Wall Street Journal headline after
John Akers left quietly:''Akers Quits at IBM''
together with the sub-headline, "But Who'd
Want This Job?" [Michael W. Miller and
Laurence Hooper, 1993]).''
In determining whether to apply, the rival
manager in fact considers
(11) E[C, + C2\Y,,Y2, incumbent not rehired]
instead of
(12)
This winner's curse further reduces rivals' ef-
forts and their willingness to accept a job,'"
since as explained above.
(13) E[C, + t, Y2, incumbent not rehired]
Assume that the incumbent manager's rents
conditional upon being rehired increase lin-
early with the wedge.
(14) c,
incumbent not rehired]
•* Miller and Hooper (1993) report that "In the end, Inter-
national Business Machines Corp. had unraveled so badly
that there wasn't any need for a fractious boardroom coup."
'" Rivals' management teams' estimates of the relevant
variances may also have to be altered to take into account
the winner's curse phenomenon, but we assume that the
truncation leaves the risk-ordering of investments the
same.
and the conditional variance,
(15) Var[C, +C2|K,,y2,
incumbent not rehired].
Recall that the incumbent manager's invest-
ment problem is
(16) max [£• [ rents | incumbent rehired ]
l ' | . ' 2 l
X Pr {incumbent rehired} ] .
Our analysis indicates that the return to a noisy
investment (one with a high value of w^ for
any given CT^) is larger than the return to one
for which K is a good signal of the project's
potential cash flows, for three distinct reasons:
(a) the noise directly discourages rivals' ef-
forts and thus meikes rivals less attractive as
managers; (b) the noise directly discourages
rivals from applying (and makes them insist
on higher compensation), thus making them a
less viable threat; and (c) the noise increases
the asymmetry of information and accordingly
the winner's curse effect.
Consider the extreme case in which rivals
can perfectly observe project 1 but only ob-
serve project 2 via a noisy signal. If the fun-
damentals of the two projects are sufficiently
close, we would expect project 2 to be chosen
even though shareholders would favor invest-
ment in project 1. By investing in the noisy
project, managers raise both the probability of
being rehired and the average rents they obtain
when they are rehired. Section IV argues that
some of the recent acquisitions in preparation
for the nascent information age probably rep-
resent such entrenchment activities.
D. Extensions: Multidimensional Effort
A similar analysis could be done to explore
a model in which, instead of choosing invest-
ment at stage 1, a manager chooses how to
allocate his own effort between the projects.
Jonathan M. Paul (1992) studied that problem
in considering the efficiency of stock-based
compensation. In terms of our notation, he
found that the manager's effort would be in-
creasing in (T? and decreasing in wj. Our con-
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elusions for such an analysis would differ from
his because, unlike Paul (1992), we imagine
that the managerial contract is negotiated or
renegotiated after these decisions. Noise (high
w?) may discourage rivals and put the incum-
bent in a better position to extract rent in these
renegotiations. In contrast, Paul's (1992) ef-
fects would dominate if the contract were pre-
set to include stock-based compensation, and
could not be renegotiated, since noisy projects
have the drawback of having little influence
on the stock price, as Paul observes.
III. Case 2: Unobservable Investment
We assume that the manager has a budget T
to allocate between projects 1 and 2, and that
although the financial statements reveal the to-
tal investment, they do not disclose the mix of
investment dollars between the two projects.
Rivals must therefore base their projections of
the firm's prospects upon the equilibrium in-
vestment mix, together with the observable
signals Y^ and Y2. The expected value of these
prospects conditional upon the observations Y,




2wy -I- 2rW2 +
Altering the mix of investment alters 7, and
Y2, but since rivals do not observe deviations,
they will not change the rule, given in equation
(17), by which they form expectations. The
intercept term here is a function of the equi-
librium investments /| and I2, unlike in
equation (4) . where actual investments are
observed.
The incumbent can reduce the effectiveness
ofrivals by raising ^[C, + C2|$in,] - £ : [ C | -I-
C2|$riv]- We can see that she will not gener-
ally choose the flrst-best investments /f and
/*, because she would benefit from shifting
some investment into the noisier project with
the higher w^lu^ and lower coefficient /3. Such
a shift increases the wedge Ci -I- C2 - [ i
C2\Yu y2]:" To see this, observe that as a
first-order approximation for small shifts in in-
vestment from I* and /* into the noisier
project, for any given realization of e, and d,,
E[C^ + C2|y,, 72] falls, while C, + C2 re-
mains constant, since F\{I*) = ^2(7?).
Shifting investment to noisier projects re-
duces rivals' effective quality by reducing
their optimal effort. A winner's curse problem,
analogous to the one in the previous section,
exacerbates this effect. In fact, all investment
might potentially be in the noisier project in
equilibrium. With sufficiently diminishing real
returns, however, it will eventually no longer
pay the incumbent to create noise, for, when
returns are lower in the noisy asset, shifting
investment lowers C| + C2 to a first-order ap-
proximation, just as it lowers E[C\ + C21 Ki,
Y2]. Lowering C| + C2 lowers the incumbent's
effort under any given incentive contract,
making her a less desirable manager. More-
over, to the extent that the manager also places
weight on Ci -I- C2 in her decision prob-
lem (perhaps because she initially holds
stock options), lowering C\ + C2 is directly
undesirable.
We should finally observe that since rivals
cannot observe the investment mix here, the
incumbent cannot affect Var[C| -I- C2I Ki, F2]
as she could in the previous section; in this
section Var[C| -I- C21 Ki, 72] is determined by
the equilibrium investment levels.
IV. Implications
We conclude with some implications and
interpretations of our analysis, asking four
questions:
" With full knowledge of her investment level, the
incumbent manager forms expectations about what out-
siders' uninformed expectations will be. The incumbent's
expectations might be written E,„[E^M(C^ + C2I K,, K,)|/,,
I2], and it is important to realize that it is an equilibrium
condition that at the equilibrium investment levels, /,, /,,
£in[£UC, -I- c i r , , y,)|/,, /,] = £ij(c, + c,) | / , , hi
Because of the information difference of the two expec-
tation operators, this equality would not hold "out of equi-
librium" if the incumbent reallocated investment to try to
create a wedge to get rents. This equality is a condition
reflecting consistent or rational expectations.
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(i) Does this model explain management bi-
ases toward excessive growth such as
those observed by Gordon Donaldson
(1984 pp. 36-42)?
In our view, managers' rents are associated
with investing in noisy projects. If a firm never
invested in new projects but simply main-
tained old assets, its manager would derive
little rent, since past project returns would pro-
vide good information about asset values.
Indiscriminate growth will not, however,
help management. For instance, replicating es-
tablished ventures of known value does not
benefit management. Growth increases a man-
ager's rents in our model when returns are un-
certain and when this uncertainty is resolved
sooner for insiders than for outsiders. We think
it a fair generalization that in new and emerg-
ing enterprises both a^ and w^ are quite high,
so we should look at these investments for ev-
idence of entrenchment activities. The model
can thus help explain biases toward growth,
supplementing more traditional explanations
of "empire building."
This bias toward innovative activities is not
all bad. A bias toward innovation and expen-
ditures on R&D may countervail tendencies
toward excessive conservatism, tendencies
such as managerial myopia,'^ or the fact that
managers tend to be more risk-averse tban
their typically better-diversified shareholders.
(ii) What implications does the theory have
concerning the efficiency of corporate
acquisitions and divestitures?
Traditional takeover theory argued that
1980's-style restructurings are necessarily
efficiency-enhancing, since in each case,
assets are sold to the manager or management
team that can most effectively employ them,
as evidenced by the price the winning bidder
is willing to pay. Our analysis of information
asymmetries enriches our understanding of the
patterns of divestiture and acquisition and ex-
plains how inefficiencies can arise. If scant
rents are associated with "mature" or well-
established enterprises, it pays to spin-off such
assets to owner-managers (who maximize
value). The nonowner managers can use the
proceeds to purchase assets whose value is
hard for rivals to ascertain. Thus, in an auction
for an asset (such as the recent bidding by
QVC and Viacom for Paramount), what any
manager is willing to pay depends not only on
what the firm can extract from the asset, but
on the rents she can derive from controlling it.
These rents are likely to be larger if she can
quickly alter the asset to make its market value
more uncertain to outsiders. Thus, the "man-
agerial" value of an asset may differ across
firms; and the asset will be sold to the firm with
the highest managerial value, not necessarily
the one with the highest expected value of
returns.
Managerial rents may be quite high for ac-
quisitions that have great potential synergies
with a firm's existing assets. Because the
returns are supposed to materialize from syn-
ergies, they cannot be well established by
studying the past results of the target firm.
Only time can reveal the returns. Moreover,
returns will likely be revealed much sooner to
incumbents than to rivals.
The recent wave of acquisitions in the
communications, computer, and entertainment
industries may promote entrenchment.'^ Man-
agers are seeking long-horizon synergies in
what they hope are the key information tech-
nologies of the next century. Such acquisitions
have significant upside potential, but the
downside may be as important to management
as the upside. It is the uncertainty inherent
to "potential" that creates rents, and as long
as potential remains and inside managers see
realizations before outsiders, incumbents may
expect personal prosperity. Such assets are
wise acquisitions for management, even if
expected returns are not impressive. In con-
trast, nonsynergistic acquisitions, such as
'- See Paul (1991) for a short survey of the literature
on myopia and for an instructive theory of why managers
concentrate on immediate returns to maximize stock-
market value in a noisy world.
" Examples include the Time-Wamer merger, the ac-
quisition of Paramount by Viacom, and the acquisitions
of McCaw Cellular Communications by AT&T. See Wall
Street Journal (1994) for a discussion of the new merger
wave.
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typified the formation of diversified conglom-
erates in the 196O's and 197O's, are not par-
ticularly valuable for entrenchment; they
invite the sorts of takeovers and spin-offs that
dominated the 198O's.
(iii) What can be done to combat or limit the
rent-seeking we discuss?
First, by being aware of the natural potential
biases in managerial behavior, the board of di-
rectors or shareholders can hope to uncover
and stop the most flagrant instances of biased
investment behavior. One recent example
might be the efforts of two large QVC share-
holders. Liberty Media and Comcast, to derail
Barry Diller's attempted acquisition of CBS
(see Chicago Tribune, 1994). A major quan-
dary firms face, however, is that many invest-
ments that increase profits also increase
managerial rents. For instance, profits can be
high in new enterprises, but the barriers which
serve to enhance firm profits may equally
enhance managerial rents (see Benjamin E.
Hermalin [1992] for a different view).
Second, the board may seek a way to pre-
vent renegotiation of wages; it might "consti-
tutionalize" the CEO's pay in corporate
bylaws. Such an approach, however, has draw-
backs: the inertial staying power of some by-
laws may itself prove costly (the hazards of
inflexibility are well illustrated by the Ameri-
can Tobacco Co.),''* and some states have
acted to limit compensation schemes in by-
laws.'' Perhaps a better way to limit (though
not eliminate) the rent-seeking we analyze is
the common plan to cope with other agency
problems: at the expense of inefficient risk-
bearing, boards may require high (initial)
stock ownership by management.
'"In 1912, the shareholders of the American Tobacco
Co. adopted a bylaw granting the president a bonus equal
to 2.5 percent of net profits, with 1.5 percent going to each
vice president. Twenty-eight years later, in 1930, this by-
law yielded the president an $840,000 bonus! The minor-
ity shareholders can perhaps be excused their incivility for
suggesting in Rogers v. Hill (289 U.S. 582, 1933), that
such a payment constituted waste.
" Consider North Carolina Business Corporation Act
§16(3) (1973): "No bylaw authorizing compensation of
officers measured by the amount of a corporation's income
A third approach is for either boards or the
government to require more stringent and detailed
accounting and reporting. For instance, if reports
identify the mix of investment, the distortions in
Section in are eliminated. Furthermore, all the
distortions we identify can be reduced to the ex-
tent that managers are required to report inside
information faster and more accurately.
We recognize that it is in the nature of pri-
vate information that calls for revelation are
easier made than effectuated. Nonetheless, re-
porting requirements can have an effect. Few
can doubt that because of the U.S. Securities
Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act
of 1934, important information is public that
would otherwise remain private. (Compare the
information available about publicly traded
companies in the United States with that avail-
able in nations that do not have, or do not en-
force, such legislation.)
(iv) Finally, what empirical questions does
our research open?
Our paper raises a number of empirical ques-
tions, most of which will require ingenuity to an-
swer. In principle, one might test the predictions
of the model if one were first willing to take a
stand on what kinds of investments have retums
known better to incumbents than rivals. One
could then try to determine whether the marginal
retum tends to be lower for such investments than
for those with retums that are more equally ob-
servable to insiders and outsiders. Such a result
would imply that managers favor noisy invest-
ments and invest beyond the point where retums
are equated. Since other papers (e.g., Paul, 1991,
1992) predict that managers who maximize
shareholder value will shy away from noisy in-
vestments, empirical results would be helpful for
understanding managerial objectives.
It would also be valuable to investigate how
investment patterns have responded to
changes in reporting requirements by the Fi-
nancial Accounting Standards Board (FASB)
and by regulatory bodies such as the Securities
or volume of business shall be valid after five years from
its adoption unless renewed by the vote of the holders of
a majority of the outstanding shares regardless of limita-
tion on voting rights."
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and Exchange Commission (SEC). Signifi-
cant responses might indicate that managers
do, in fact, exploit information asymmetries
when they are allowed.
APPENDIX
We first prove a simple statistical lemma
necessary to derive the conditional expec-
tations E[C\ + C2\Y^, F2] and variances
Var[C| -I- C2I Ki, 1^2 ] given in the paper.
LEMMA Al: Ifx and y are independent normal
variables andX ~ 3^{0, a^) andy ~ M.0, w^),
then the distribution ofx given that x -\- y = s is
a^ + w^ a^ + w'
PROOF:





xs s^ s^ 1
W^ 2w^ 2((T^ + H'^)J
X \ X - S
Thus, the distribution of J: given that A: -I- >> = .y is
We can use Lemma Al to find £[Ci -I-
C2|y|, Y2] and Var[C| + CjlY^, Yj]. Since
the investment levels are known.
S2 + ^2=l'2-F2(/2)]
which by Lemma Al equals
F,(/,)-l-F2(/2) + /3,(y, - F , (
+ P2(Y2-F2(
where
{at + wt)lt af + wf
Choosing/3o = F | ( / | ) [ l - /3|] -I- F2(/2)[l -
/32]. we get the formula in the text for £ [ C| +
C21 K,, 72] • It also follows that
By Lemma Al, this equals half the sum of the
harmonic means of I]a] and I]w] and of
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